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ABSTRACT
This thesis presents a short history of merger activity among
advertising agencies. Statistical data has been collected on the
number of mergers that occurred in selected years between 1950 and 1978.
Three periods of heightened merger activity appear to have occurred within
this 28 year span. These merger waves will be discussed with regard to
possible environmental factors which may have influenced their occurance.
Additionally, motives often voiced in support of ad agency mergers will
be discussed with regard to their plausibility.
Finally, a statistical analysis of possible economies of scale
will be presented. Data relating the number of employees in an ad agency
with the gross income of the agency appear to demonstrate that large
agencies are able to use fewer employees per given dollar of business as
compared to smaller agencies.
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5CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Since the mid-1970's, the business media have increasingly drawn
attention to what many observers believe is a wave of mergers among ad-
vertising agencies. In some respects, Business Week appears to have
initiated this focus of attention when it published an article in June,
1974 covering the string of six acquisitions which Young and Rubicam had
1*
recently completed. Since then, the attention has increased each year.
In 1978, Charles Peebler of Bozell and Jacobs International provided one
measure of the magnitude of this merger wave when he stated:
Of the 92 biggest ad agencies in 1968, fully 41 have
either gone out of business or have been absorbed.2
This thesis investigates the premise that a merger wave is taking
place among advertising agencies. First to be examined is the period from
1950 through 1978: how frequently did ad agency mergers occur during that
time? Four separate periods of heightened merger activity have been iden-
tified and will be discussed (in Section 3.0) with regard to the factors
that contributed to each merger wave.
In addition to these periods of heightened activity, mergers have
been found to occur regularly and many of the reasons advanced as motives
for mergers appear to be common to all eras of merger activity. These will
be discussed in Section 4.0 of this report.
* Offset numerals indicate endnotes at back of thesis.
6Finally, economies of scale are almost always mentioned as a motive
for ad agency mergers. Section 5.0 of this report will analyze agency
statistical data on number of employees, gross income, billings, etc. for
the appearance of scale effects across a sampling of ad agencies.
While doing research, the author of this report contacted via tele-
phone an executive actively involved in the advertising industry. He was
asked if he had any thoughts on the recent wave of mergers taking place
among agencies. In a somewhat worried voice, the executive replied that he
had not heard of any such occurrences at any time during his career. When
the mystified author mentioned the many recent articles that have appeared
in Advertising Age and Fortune, the executive replied in a relieved voice:
"Oh, mergers - I thought you were investigating a wave of murders."
I wish to announce that I have discovered no evidence of a wave of
murders in the advertising industry.
7CHAPTER 2
A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ADVERTISING AGENCY
It is reported that the British Empire gave birth to the first ad-
vertising agency when Reynell and Son was founded in London in 1812. In
contrast, the United States had to wait till 1838, when its first adver-
tising agency was founded by Volney B. Palmer in Philadelphia.3 One view
holds that the emergence of agencies in the mid-1800's was a natural re-
sult of the introduction of mass circulation periodicals in this same
period.4 This opened the way for large-scale advertising and thus created
the opportunity for agencies to operate as media space brokers.
A graph of U.S. advertising expenditures (Figure 2-1) for the period
from 1776 to 1905 does indeed show that the appearance of agencies in the
mid-1800's coincided with the sudden increase in ad expenditures. As in
any growth industry, the sudden appearance of new market potential induced
individuals to enter and exploit it.
Initially ad agencies acted as space brokers for publishers and
were viewed primarily as agents of the media. Agencies sold space to
individual advertisers, and the agent in turn was paid a commission by the
media. In some instances, publishers designated a favored agent who alone
would be responsible for securing their advertisements.
From this early start as an agent of the media, ad agencies have now
reversed the relationship and are presently viewed as operating primarily
in the interests of the advertiser - not the media. Agency functions
have expanded beyond media space buying to include copywriting, art
layout, market research, public relations and other assorted functions that
81800 1825 1850 1875
Figure 2.1. U.S. Advertising Expenditures
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9in many instances allow the agency to operate as the marketing branch of
the advertiser.
From its start, the U.S. ad agency industry has grown to include
approximately 7000 agency establishments as of 1979.5 One estimate places
total U.S. advertising expenditures at 48.5 billion dollars in 1979, which
is more than $200 for every U.S. citizen. About 21.9 billion of this is
funneled through advertising agencies, which realized approximately 3.4
billion dollars as gross income for 1979.6
Figure 2-2 shows that billings (corrected for inflation) per ad
agency establishment generally increased throughout the last three decades.
However, Figure 2-3 demonstrates that growth in the number of agencies has
decreased since the early 1960's. These two facts could indicate that
entry into the industry has become more difficult or that firms are merging
faster than new ones are created. One result of either of these possibil-
ities could be an increasingly concentrated ad agency industry. Figure 2-4,
however, shows that the percent of aggregate U.S. billings controlled by
the ten largest U.S. agencies has not significantly varied over the pre-
vious three decades. Thus a trend toward an increasingly concentrated
industry (resulting from mergers or other effects) is not immediately
apparent.
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Figure 2-2. Billings Per Ad Agency Establishment
* This was calculated by dividing total receipts for all
ad agencies by the total number of ad agency establish-
ments as provided by the Census of Business (U.S. Government
Printing Office).
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in the U.S.
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Figure 2-4. Percent of total US Ad Agency Billings
Controlled by the Ten Largest U.S.
Agencies
** Calculated from data supplied by Advertising Age
in its annual issue on the top 100 ad agencies
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CHAPTER 3
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF AGENCY MERGERS
3.1 Merger Data Sources
One prime objective of this report was to determine if indeed a
merger wave is presently occurring among advertising agencies, and if there
have been other merger waves in the past. In this light, I set out to
assemble a merger time series for ad agencies covering the period from
1950 through the 1970's. It was soon discovered that no single source of
such data exists and that bits of data had to be collected from many peri-
odicals, as listed in Table 3-1.
Table 3-1. Sources for Ad Agency Merger Announcements
F&S Index of Corporate Change
Advertising Age
Business Periodicals Index
Business Week
Fortune
Media Decisions
New York Times
Printer's Ink
Wall Street Journal
For the period from 1971 onward, F&S Index of Corporate Change
provides the most comprehensive source of merger data, and is categorized
by SIC number. In its initial issues (1971 & 1972), it provided partial
billings information along with an indication as to whether the merger had
been completed. In later issues, it has ceased publishing such detailed
information, and provides only page and date references to trade press
articles pertaining to merger announcements. The completion of a merger
14
given its announcement, is not a foregone conclusion. During the data
search, it appeared that a large percentage of announced mergers are either
never completed or are broken apart within several months of their initial
consolidation. Confirmation of completion was at times difficult to locate
since the trade press appears more interested in reporting merger nnounce-
ments than cessation of merger talks. The most reliable source for con-
firmation, however, was found to be the Standard Directory of Advertising
Agencies where the merged agencies would disappear as separate entities
and reappear as a newly named agency.
The Business Periodicals Index (BPI) falls next in usefulness as
a source of merger data. The BPI appears to have begun indexing ad agency
merger articles in 1947 as a separate "consolidation" section under
"advertising agency". However the indexing is not as thorough as F&S Index
of Corporate Change and severely under-reports merger related articles for
the period of the 1950's. For this period, a manual search of Printers Ink
and Advertising Age proved to be the most reliable means of collecting
data. These two publications appear to be the ones most attentive to ad
agency mergers and provided the bulk of the merger data presented in this
thesis. Neither of these publications appear to issue an index of articles.
Advertising Age does provide a computerized search of its previous issues
through its corporate library in Chicago. For a $50 fee, a search of a
two year period using one keyword as an index can be made. However,
Advertising Age does not gaurantee the thoroughness of the index nor if
articles are indexed under a user designated keyword. The only way to
determine this is to perform a search which entails the payment of the fee.
15
The New York Times and Wall Street Journal do publish yearly indexes
but they were found to contain few articles on ad agency mergers. Business
Week, Fortune and Media Decisions do not have yearly indexes but each did
occasionally publish merger related articles which were very informative.
These articles were located primarily through use of the BPI.
In an effort to collect merger data in a consistent manner for each
year, it was decided to collect merger statistics in intervals of four
years for the period between 1950 and 1970. For the 1970's, data was col-
lected in intervals of two years. F&S Index of Corporate Change, Printer's
Ink and Advertising Age were the primary sources of merger announcements.
Appendix A lists the merger data in detail while Figure 3-1 presents in
graphical form the number of completed ad agency mergers in a given year.
Agency billings data was also collected for each merger and this
information is also included in Appendix A. However, billings data are
not always provided when a merger is announced, and a standard source of
this data did not become available until the mid-1960's. At that time, the
Standard Directory of Advertising Agencies began including it on a regular
7basis.
At this point, a note of caution must be made with regard to the
merger data series. It was noted during the data search that all publica-
tions such as Advertising Age went through cycles of attentiveness or
inattentiveness to agency merger announcements. This suspicion was
strengthened by the fact that periodicals would occasionally dedicate
lengthy articles to discussion of a wave of mergers but that not all peri-
odicals picked up on the same merger waves. Very often, mergers that were
reported in Printer's Ink, for example, would go unnoticed in Advertising
Age - and vice versa.
16
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A second factor affecting the data is that periodicals would become
increasingly attentive to merger announcements as more mergers were announced.
For example, in the peak year of 1958, Advertising Age devoted page after
page to merger data and at year's end summarized in one issue all mergers
that had occurred in that one year. Just two years later, in the 60's,
little attention was given to mergers. I suspect that at that
time data was being underreported in comparison to 1958.
Lastly, there is probably a strong bias among the periodicals
toward publicizing only those mergers involving the larger agencies, which
may be of greater interest to readers. In one respect, this is not a
serious problem since the larger agencies control the bulk of the billings--
the top ten control approximately 40%. However, there are most probably
many small agency mergers taking place each year that do not receive pub-
licity and, as a result, which do not appear in this report's data series.
At this point, a positive note appears in order. The ebb and flow
of attention directed at agency mergers by periodicals most probably ac-
centuates the size of merger waves by underreporting mergers during quiet
periods. Nevertheless, what the press perceives as newsworthy tends to
reflect what is actually occurring. Thus what appears to have been a
merger wave in the late 1950's (Figure 3-1) was probably just that. How-
ever, its relative size may be accentuated.
3.2 Merger Time Series (1950-1978)
Figure 3-1 summarizes the merger data collected for this thesis.
A brief glance at Figure 3-1 indicates that a merger wave did occur in
the late 1950's, while the 1960's were relatively quiet. By 1974, however,
merger activity appears to have increased again with the trend continuing
18
into the last half of the 1970's. It must be mentioned that these statis-
tics cover mergers between domestic U.S. agencies and do not include for-
eign acquisitions.
A second way of viewing the merger data is the total amount of agency
billings involved in the mergers in any given year. As mentioned earlier,
billings data could not generally be located for the period of the 1950's,
but Figure 3-2 does plot the total amount of known billings involved in
agency mergers for the 1960's and 1970's. As presented, Figure 3-2 is a
little deceptive, however. Inflation of media prices plus growth in the
number of advertising messages has increased the magnitude of total U.S.
advertising expenditures throughout the 1960's and 1970's. This growth
effect tends to mask what may or may not be a trend toward mergers in-
volving a larger share of the ad agency market. Figure 3-3 attempts to
correct for this by deflating the merged billings data for each year with
a weighting factor calculated as shown below. The result as shown
in Figure 3-3 is that a merger wave still appears to be taking place, with
the trend being toward a larger percentage of industry billings involved
in mergers.
B62 = total U.S. ad expenditures in 1962
B. = total U.S. ad expenditure in year i
weh =B.
weight B
factor B62
** The data points on Figure 3-3 were calculated by multiplying the data
points on Figure 3-2 by the weighting factor calculated above.
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One last measure of merger activity was performed by calculating
the ratio of the billings size of the larger agency to the billings size
of the smaller agency with which it merged. This calculation was per-
formed for each individual merger. The geometric mean and median of these
individual ratios were then calculated for each year and the results
graphed in Figure 3-4. This was done to determine if there is a trend
toward mergers between agencies of equal or unequal sizes. Unfortunately
the data on Figure 3-4 bounces about sufficiently to preclude the obser-
vance of any such trend. Of course, it could simply be that no such sys-
tematic trend exists. However, Figure 3-5 graphs the arithmetic average
of billings involved per individual merger for each year, and here there
does appear to be a trend toward much larger billings per merger. Figure
3-5 does correct for growth in total U.S. ad expenditures as was done for
Figure 3-3.
3.3 Comparison with Aggregate U.S. Merger Statistics
Before diving into the details of the mergers that have taken place
among advertising agencies, one is tempted to examine briefly what econo-
mists have been able to learn about aggregrate merger activity in the U.S.
and how it might relate to ad agencies. Merger historians have often
noted that the aggregate level of merger activity in the U.S. has been
highly cyclical, with peaks of activity in 1899, 1929, and 1969, as shown
in Figure 3-8. This apparent periodicity has led to suspicion that some
group of environmental factors might be causing the appearance of these
merger waves. However, such factors have not been reliably identified and
researchers have become skeptical that a single force is causing the peaks.9
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Economists have also noted that merger waves tend to occur in per-
10
iods of economic health and are followed by downturns in the economy.
Again, however, there is a lack of evidence identifying the factors that
could drive a depression-prosperity cycle. In fact, the evidence that
such a cycle actually may exist is only suggestive at best.
Figure 3-6 superimposes the merger data for U.S. ad agencies upon
the aggregate merger time series for the U.S. This comparison is being
made on the slim chance that some group of environmental factors in causing
merger waves to coincide between industries. Unfortunately, ad agency mer-
gers peaked in 1958 and are again peaking in the late 1970's, which brack-
ets the U.S. aggregate merger peak of 1969.
3.4 Environmental Factors Affecting Ad Agency Mergers
3.4.1 The 1950's
A glance at Figure 3-1 indicates that, in terms of the number of
mergers, the decade of the 1950's witnessed a wave of mergers that peaked
in 1958. Actually, popular magazine articles of the period began herald-
ing a merger wave when the number of completed mergers among large agencies
suddenly increased in the early 50's. In this period, many reasons were
advanced in explanation; the majority centered around a perceived need
for a "full service" agency.
Many agency executives believed that advertisers were now demanding
additional support services, such as marketing research and media counsel-
ing - services which had to be financed out of the standard 15% commission.
Thus agency profits were viewed as being squeezed by the requirement to
carry added staff specialists to handle these expanded services. In some
26
instances, agencies were successful in negotiating extra fees for these
services, but mostly the 15% commission was viewed as a standard compensation.
One view held that a small agency could remain profitable by oper-
ating with a very lean staff and catering to small accounts that did not
demand extra services. However, when an agency approached the $3 million
(billings) level two effects occurred. First, to move above that level
required extra staff to manage the added accounts - and this meant that
expenses increased more rapidly. Second, to pass the $3 million level
required going after larger accounts. To attract such accounts required
offering the extra services - which also quickly pushed up expenses. 3
As a result, the $3 to $15 million billings range was viewed as an awkward
area in which an agency had to provide all the services of a much larger
agency without sufficient commissions to profitably fund them. Mergers
were viewed as a way to pass quickly through this range.
Since the 1950's, ad agencies have continued to use this argument
as a rationale for mergers in both periods of low and high merger activity.
So it is difficult to envision that it was a major driving force behind
the merger wave of the 50's. However, many agency executives of that
period were recorded as believing that demands for extra services were
becoming increasingly frequent; there may have been a cost squeeze peculiar
to that time. In support of this premise, it should be noted that since
that time, ad agencies have increasingly relied on charing extra fees for
ancillary services. As early as 1965, a study by Booz Allen revealed this
trend, which has continued to advance.1 4
One factor which is peculiar to the 1950's was the emergence of
TV as a new advertising medium. As shown in Figure 3-7, TV ads appeared
27
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in the late 1940's and continued to grow rapidly through the 50's. Sud-
·denly ad agencies had to learn how to handle this new medium, and a new
specialty appeared in the agency.
Again, magazine articles of the period suggested that mergers were
taking place because small agencies could not afford to carry the staff
specialists necessary to work in the new medium. Additionally, it was
felt that national TV accounts could only be handled by a large agency
with offices in several cities; such agencies could best handle local
spot TV campaigns. Bob Newell of the agency Cunningham & Walsh, for
instance, was quoted as saying that C&W's mergers were motivated (during
the 50's) by a need to establish regional spot TV expertise for handling
16
Texaco's national TV campaign. Newell went further to state that
regional representation was more economical than traveling out of New York
and provided for closer policing of client media schedules. Acquisition
of regional representation via merger was viewed as easier than opening
a shop in a new location since regional knowledge was being acquired
through a merger rather than by trial-and-error.
The incentive for the regional shop to merge with the larger agency
was that it lowered some of the barriers to the shop's participation in
large national TV accounts. Since most national TV originated in New York
and Los Angeles, buying network TV time was easier if the agency was rep-
resented in those cities. A merger with a larger agency having offices
in those cities allowed the regional shop to participate nationally.
In summary, the decade of the 50's was apparently dominated by the
problems of adapting to the new medium of TV and the ad agencies seem to
have believed that survival via merger was the best path.
29
3.4.2 The 1960's
After the merger wave of the 1950's, agency merger activity slowed
down considerably with far fewer completed mergers being reported in the
trade press. Actually, one source did report that agency mergers among
small firms were on the increase,7 but a search of contemporary magazine
articles has revealed no such trend. It might simply be that small agency
mergers aren't newsworthy and go unreported.
Toward the end of the 1960's, a trend did emerge among agencies,
however, when they became very concernedwith diversification. A survey
conducted in 1969 revealed that many agencies believed that diversification
outside of standard agency business was required to reduce their risk.
The start of this diversification movement is difficult to pinpoint,
but Doyle Dane Bernback appears to have been one of the initial partici-
pants with its 1968 investment in George Jensen Inc. - a prestigious
19
Fifth Avenue store in New York. Other movements included such diverse
actions as the Lois Holland Calloway agency's opening of a personnel place-
ment agency and.Doyle Dane Bernbach's purchase of an ice cream and dairy
products company. Table 3-2 provides a more complete listing of similar
actions taken by other agencies.
Modern financial theory holds that companies should not seek to
diversify for the sake of risk reduction alone since outside investors
can accomplish the same thing much more efficiently by holding a widely
diversified portfolio of stocks. However, most advertising agencies are
privately held, with the principals and employees holding most of the
equity. For these individuals, it may be rational to seek risk reduction
through diversification of the agency since their portfolio of investments
30
Table 3-2. Ad Agency Diversification Moves
* Ted Bates & Co. formed Cybics Computer Corp., a subsidiary.
* Cadwell Davis Co. - Naomi Inc. (cosmetics for balck women).
* Campbell-Mithun - several outdoor properties in St. Louis.
· Doyle Dane Bernbach - George Jensen Inc., Lux Brill Productions
(TV production house).
* Foote, Cone & Belding - eight cable systems (owned by FCB
Cablevision, a subsidiary).
* Kaufman, Spicer & Co. - New Richmond (Wis.) News; Skyway News.
* Lois Holland Callaway - opened Mantle Men & Namath Girls Inc.
(51% ownership).
· Mathison/Ress - Backstage Tours.
* Papert, Koenig, Lois - acquired ACS Industries, electronic company
Cybernetics Plastic Corp.; Century Cycle.
* Reach, McClinton - WOOT, Watertown, N.Y., am and fm; WALY,
Herkimer, N.Y.
* Tatham-Laird & Kudner - acquired Industrial Water Engineering,
Linens, Domestics, & Bath Products, and Musical Merchandise
Review from Select Publications.
· J. Walter Thompson Co. - Porto Rican and American Insurance Co.
(80% interest).
· Tracy-Locke - KCNW, Tulsa; KJIM, Forth Worth.
· Wells, Rich, Greene - invested $943,946 and $250,000 in two
unnamed oil companies; started a feature film business
31
is most probably heavily biased toward the agency. They could sell off
part of their investment in the agency and diversify their holdings with
the receipts, but they probably value holding managerial control more
than portfolio diversification.
As a point of interest, Papert Koenig Lois Inc. was the first agency
to become publicly owned (1962) and since then only seven other agencies
have made a similar move (Table 3-3).20
Table 3-3. Ad Agencies That Are Publicly Owned
Agency Where Stock Is Registered
BBDO Over the Counter
Doyle Dane Bernback Over the Counter
Foote, Cone & Belding Over the Counter
Grey Over the Counter
Interpublic Group New York Stock Exchange
Ogilvy & Mather Over the Counter
J. Walter Thompson New York Stock Exchange
Assuming that diversification for risk reduction may not be totally
irrational for a closely held company, the agency's management team must
still select acquisitions that management is capable of operating effi-
ciently. In fact, it appears to be a widely held belief in the ad agency
industry that most of the diversification moves were not compatible with
existing management expertise. The financial results are reported as
being largely unsuccessful.2 1
The fall-out from the moves into other businesses came very quickly,
with such examples as DDB placing up for sale its chain of Oklahoma dis-
count stores two years after their initial acquisition. By the mid-1970's,
32
most agencies had sold off their non-advertising acquisitions and were
returning to what they knew best - with a renewed interest in agency
23
mergers.
While still in the midst of diversification moves, however, U.S.
agencies also began a global expansion phase which Advertising Age labeled
an international merger wave. 4 This thesis primarily addresses domestic
mergers among U.S. ad agencies, but this global expansionary period is
worth a few words in passing.
In late 1969 some industry spokesmen were predicting that the world
market for advertising would increase by 150% over the decade of the 1970's.
However, two-thirds of this growth would occur outside the U.S. Given the
bouyant prospects for international advertising, it would seem inevitable
that U.S. agencies would seek to exploit it by moving overseas. Table 3-4
lists some of the mergers that took place in 1969.
Observers of global expansionary movements have noted that a com-
pany's first move into a foreign country is often accomplished via a joint
venture with a company located in the country of interest. Joint ventures
give the expanding company increased access to knowledge of the local lan-
guage, customs, and market conditions, thus lowering the barriers to entry
25
into that market. It would appear that the advantages offered by a joint
venture or merger are especially important to an ad agency since its suc-
cess is especially contingent on an intimate knowledge of the local media
and market conditions.
International analysts have also observed that corporations exhibit
a trend wherein industry segments tend to move into foreign countries in
waves. When one industry participant moves abroad, the leading competitors
33
Table 3-4. International Joint Ventures Announced in 1969
Ad Agency Country
Needhan, Harper, Steers U.S.
S.H. Benson Ltd. Britain
Havas Conseil France
Leo Burnett Co. U.S.
LPE Ltd. Britain
Benton & Bowles U.S.
Carl Gabler Werbegesellschoft Germany
BBDO U.S.
Baker Advertising Ltd. Canada
Ogilvy & Mather U.S.
Corpa Venezuela
Lennen & Newell: announces U.S.
joint ventures with agencies
in 30 countries
McCann-Erickson U.S.
Bergenholy & Arneson Denmark
usually follow within a period of six or seven years. This appears to be
partly a defensive maneuver to gain entry into the foreign market before
26
the competition locks it up. Thus the increased movement overseas in
the late 1970's may have been a defensive action as well as an exploitive
one.
As a final comment, some observers have noted that ad agencies per-
·ceived a growing threat from consumer activists and government regulatory
agencies in the late 60's. As a result, agency executives became skeptical
about the domestic industry's potential for long-term growth and began
searching for a more promising business climate.27 Indeed, the American
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Association of Advertising Agencies still believes that the top problem
of today's ad agency is a widespread belief that advertising is misleading.2 8
Some observers believe this was a contributing factor in movement of ad
agencies abroad and into other businesses during the late 1960's and the
early 1970's. The explanation sounds plausible but one can only speculate
as to its importance as a factor in the business decisions made during the
late 60's.
3.4.3 The 1970's
Ad agencies entered the 1970's on a quiet note - at least in the
area of domestic mergers. By 1974, however, merger activity began increas-
ing again as shown in Figure 3-1. A combination of factors has been ad-
vanced as a cause for this heightened level of merger activity. First,
some sources reported that advertising media costs were rising more rap-
idly than ad agency operating expenses.29 Since agencies typically re-
ceive a 15% commission on their media payments, they realized a net gain
from the situation - higher ad agency profits. Secondly, ad agency pro-
fits were further enahnced by an increased level of aggregate U.S. ad
expenditures as (Figure 3-8).
Reasons advanced for the increased ad expenditures tend to point
to the invreased level of consumer spending (Figure 3-9 ) that occurred
in the mid 1970's. Some industry observers theorized that increased con-
sumer spending induced manufacturers to increase their level of advertis-
ing as a competitive move to raise their share of the newly expanding
market.3 0 The validity of this theory is of course difficult to test.
However, accepting the premise of increased ad agency profit margins and
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aggregate ad expenditures some industry observers contend that the ad
agencies were induced by the resulting cash inflow to seek mergers as a
use for the cash.
In support of the claim that advertising media costs were rising
more rapidly than ad agency operating expenses, a study by the American
Association of Advertising Agencies does indicate that the average profit
of member agencies did follow a rising trend that started in the early 70's
31(Table 3-5). The same study also shows that agency payroll expenses
as percent of gross income - did show a downward trend that started in
approximately 1973 or 1974 (Table 3-5). Of course, this could have re-
sulted from either of the following:
- Agencies used fewer employees to handle the same aount of work.
- Employee salaries were affected less by inflation than by com-
missions on billings.
Table 3-5. Ad Agency Net Profit and Payroll Expense as a Percentage
of Gross Income
Average Net Profit for
Incorporated Agencies Average Payroll Expense
Year (Percent of Gross Income) (Percent of Gross Income)
1970 3.11 66.67
1971 2.87 65.26
1972 3.62 64.53
1973 3.87 64.37
1974 3.43 64.11
1975 3.91 63.23
1976 4.52 61.86
1977 4.36 61.41
1978 4.74 61.02
38
Detailed tracking of employee pay scales and media cost indices
would require more information than this author has been able to locate,
so it is difficult to sift out which of the above factors is dominant.
However, published media cost indices - when corrected for inflation -
do demonstrate that costs in some categories were rising faster than the
general price level (Table 3-6). When the cost index for each media is
weighted by the media's contribution to overall U.S. ad expenditures, the
trend of media costs does appear to be rising faster than the general price
level as shown in Table 3-6. Table 3-6 is in terms of constant 1970 dollars.
While the evidence is certainly not conclusive, it does lend some
support to the premise that rising media costs were helping to increase
agency profits in the latter 1970's. Industry observers conclude from
this that increased cash flow from higher profits is leading many agencies
to seek uses for it. However, because of the unsuccessful experiences with
diversification outside of standard agency business, the agencies are re-
turning to their area of expertise - advertising. This is resulting in
the recent wave of mergers among domestic ad agencies.3
One wonders, however, why the same conditions that afford agencies
the resources to fund mergers would not simultaneously dissuade other
agencies from seeking to be acquired. If their profit potential is also
rising, one would expect the acquisition price to rise - which would negate
the buying power of the excess cash in the acquiring agency.
One explanation offered as a solution to this paradox is that small-
er firms are being caught in a credit squeeze and are thus forced to seek
acquisition. High interest rates (prevalent in the late 70's) prompt
clients to hold back payments to their ad agencies so that cash can be
39
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funneled into money market funds to exploit short term interest rates.
Small agencies have limited resources to fund accounts receivable and
thus may be forced to seek a merger as a means of survival.3 3
Evidence of such an effect is difficult to find, however. In
fact, a survey conducted among fifty agencies in New York that prim'arily
bill less than $5 million a year revealed no such problem, and this was
as late as October, 1979, when rates were very high.3 4
What is even more interesting is that the media has claimed that
advertising agencies, not advertisers, are routing cash into money funds
35
and that the media is the one being squeezed - not the ad agency. It
is impossible to determine which actor is gaining from the payment slow-
down on the basis of the published accounts. However, the advertiser
would appear to be in the stronger position since the agency and the media
must both wait for the ad agency to complete its payment before the money
can be funneled to the concerned parties.
In summary, published accounts tend to pinpoint increased cash flow
from inflated media commissions as a major force behind the merger wave
of the 1970's. However, a convincing argument has not been advanced as to
why the buying power of this cash would not be negated by a compensating
rise in acquisition prices of other agencies that enjoy the same prosperity.
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CHAPTER 4
MERGER MOTIVES COMMON TO ALL ERAS
4.1 Managerial Talent
The previous three sections of this report sought to capture the
differences that distinguished the merger trends between 1950 and 1980.
However, in some ways, what is more striking than the differences is the
regularity with which certain motives are advanced as reasons for mergers
over the decades.
The search for articles written on the subject was extended back
to the late 1920's and a list of motives common to these eras was accumu-
lated (Table 4-1). One interesting motive involves the type of indiviudal
who succeeds in becoming the owner of a successful small agency. According
to Joseph Caggiano of Bozell & Jacobs, this type of individual has achieved
his status because of his entreprenurial spirit and multiple talents.3
As their agencies grow, however, these individuals become more involved
with the financial aspects of the business and less with the creative and
operating functions. Many are not interested or trained for these mana-
gerial positions, and they become dissatisfied. As a result, a friendly
merger is sought - one which will remove some of the financial and
accounting drudgery from their position. Whether or not this really
accomplishes the intended purpose is open to question.
4.2 Retiring Owner
A second reason that prompts many mergers is the desire of the
founder to extract his investment from the agency so that he may retire.
As of 1978, only seven agencies had made public issues of stock - the
42
Table 4-1. Merger Motives That Appear To Be Common to all Eras
- Ad agency owner sheds some managerial and accounting
drudgery by merging with a larger firm whose staff will
take on some of the book work.
- Owner wishes to retire and extract his equity.
- Small firms encounter trouble in attracting larger clients
because of a psychological stigma attached to small bill-
ings size.
- An ad agency must open other offices before it can offer
the wide geographical coverage demanded by large clients.
- Agency must grow so that it can carry the staff needed
to offer the in-depth services demanded by large clients.
- An agency should diversify its industry specialties as
a means to risk reduction.
vast majority of agencies are still privately held. The founder must, in
most cases, locate an outside buyer or sell the agency to the employees.3 7
One observer has noted that there is usually a preference for
selling to an outside agency since they typically are willing to pay more
than the present employees. It could be that the outside agency per-
ceives a synergistic advantage to the merged firms that justifies a higher
price or it may be that the employees don't have the funds necessary to
,match the outside agency's offer. However, some skeptical observes have
voiced the opinion that the only one to gain in most small-agency deals
is the owner of the small agency.39
Regardless of who wins or loses in the deal, it appears that a
"sell and bail-out" scenario is fairly common among agency mergers.
Charles Rumrill of Rumrill-Hoyt, Inc. reported in 1966, for example, that
many of the agencies acquired by Rumrill-Hoyt had not been sold to employees
43
because they could not raise the funds and the principal owner wanted to
40
retire. . Recently some observers have suspected that several unnamed
big mergers of 1979 were motivated by a "bail-out" philosophy.4 1
4.3 Size Stigma
Small agencies believe they must grow large to attract the larger
accounts. This sounds like circular reasoning, but it is widely felt that
billings size has a connotation of capability and expertise. In many agency
merger announcements, this is often implied as a contributing factor; but
occasionally the principals involved in a merger will openly state that
a size stigma was preventing them from winning larger accounts, and the
merger was a step toward solving that problem.42
Industrial Marketing conducted a survey in 1975 to determine if
advertisers were influenced by billing size when choosing an agency. 3
One automatically suspects the responses received in such a survey since,
in the eyes of many, quality - not size - is the "right" answer. Never-
theless, the survey results are interesting for their ambivalence alone.
A common response was that "bigness does not matter if you have the right
people". Other responses, however, centered on such concerns as:
- A small agency may not be able to handle the cash flow problems
of a large account.
- Large agencies may be able to attract the most talented employees,
since large agencies may be able to offer higher salaries than
smaller agencies.
- A small agency may have to staff up considerably to handle a
large account.
Advertisers did voice doubts about the depth of service a small
agency could offer, but they simultaneously worried that their account
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might receive less attention if it were placed with an agency that was too
large. What these results seem to imply is that advertisers are first con-
cerned with the particular personnel placed on their account. This was
mentioned several times in the survey, but there was also a concern about
matching the size of the agency to the account size - in other words,
billings size of an agency is a factor in its selection.
In support of this size issue is a study performed in the late 1950's.
It surveyed a cross-section of agencies regarding the percentage of their
total billings contributed by the largest client (Table 4-2).44 The per-
centage does vary with billings size but not very much, implying that the
tailoring of account size to agency might be taking place. Of course, it
might be the agencies themselves who limit the size of an account they go
after. It seeems more likely, however, that the advertiser is doing the
screening.
An interesting comment on this problem was made by C. Rumrill of
Rumrill-Hoyt in 1966. At one point, General Dynamics and Alcoa were
Rumrill-Hoyt's largest accounts. When General Dynamics bought Stromberg-
Carlson and Alcoa bought Rome Cable, Rumrill-Hoyt believed it might lose
the accounts to larger agencies. It was thought that the newly diversified
companies would search for larger agencies capable of providing more in-
depth service. In C. Rumrill's words, this threat led them to merge with
45
Baldwin, Bowers and Moser Catins in the same year. Whether or not a
size stigma exists, agency belief in it appears to directly affect merger
activity.
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Table 4-2. Largest Client's Percentage of Total Billings
Number of
Percent of Billings Agencies
Size of Agency from Largest Client Surveyed
under $1 million 20.5 263
$1 million to $3 million 19.5 137
$3 million to $10 million 25.5 72
over $10 million 22.0 36
This data was taken from the following study performed for the association
of National Advertisers:
The Advertising Industry
ANA, 1958, p. 61.
The study surveyed a total of 508 advertising agencies which were spread
across the range of billings as shown above.
4.4 Geographical Expansion
In the universe of reasons advanced in explanation of agency mergers,
"geographical extension" is second in frequency only to "broaden services".
Richard C. Christian (president of Marstellar Inc.) summarized much of the
rationale when he stated that if an agency's growth potential in one geo-
graphical market is limited, it can grow by expanding to other cities.
In piles of newspaper reports, it appeared that about half of agency mergers
were aimed at establishing an office in another city.
Of course, an agency could simply open an office in the city of
interest, but many agency executives perceive the risk and cost of a merger
as being lower than that of opening a new office. As examples, Campbell-
Ewald, MacManus, John & Adams, and the Griswold-Wshleman Company all moved
into the Chicago market by acquiring agencies there.47 One advantage of
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this approach is that the acquiring agency is purchasing a working knowledge
of the new market's local media - it does not have to acquire it through
a lengthy start-up period.
A second advantage of this method of geographical expansion is that
the acquiring firm gains the account managers of the acquired firm. When
advertisers are asked what they consider important in selecting an agency,
the primary criterion is the agency person who will be assigned to their
48
account. Thus the acquiring firm is purchasing a certain amount of good-
will that the acquired firm has generated during its existence.
Unfortunately, a merger often results in several account managers
leaving the acquired agency and taking their accounts with them. Mergers
often cause such departures when the personnel of a smaller agency are
merged into a much larger and presumably bureaucratic agency. The fear
is that the bureaucracy will destroy the working environment to which they
are accustomed. A similar, more subtle situation arises when the personnel
of a smaller agency have planned to purchase the agency from the retiring
owners, and it is merged instead.4 9
When a client diversifies beyond regional bounds, agencies often
voice a fear that the account will also grow and then depart for a larger
agency. As a result, some agencies feel compelled to expand beyond local
barriers to maintain their growing accounts. Agencies and advertisers
appear to disagree (even within their own ranks) as to the extent to which
an agency must be physically represented in the locations in which a client
wishes to advertise. All do agree, however, that there is a performance
premium associated with having first-hand knowledge of the media in a tar-
geted location. An interesting perspective on this issue is provided by
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John Zowden - a vice president of ITT. Zowden states that ITT believes
an agency is only as good as its local service. As a result, ITT retains
100 different agencies to handle its regional accounts. Colgate-Palmolive,
another national firm, retains eighty agencies.5 0
Clearly not all national advertisers have the resources or desire
to deal with this number of agencies. P. O'Toole of Foote, Cone & Belding,
for one, believes that some advertisers prefer the centralized planning
of a national campaign that a single large agency is able to provide.5
Of course, localized agencies could compensate for a lack of regional
offices by sending representatives into the field, but the establishment
of permanent offices in strategic cities may serve to lend additional
credibility to an agency's claim regarding national capabilities. It
might also be less expensive when the cost of travel is considered.
To gain perspective on this issue, a sample of 100 ad agencies was
selected from the top 600 U.S. ad agencies. The number of U.S. offices
and total U.S. billings was collected for each agency and graphed as a
scatter plot (Figure 4-1). This figure shows that most agencies billing
less than $100 million a year generally have from one to three offices.
A few have more than five. Agencies billing more than $100 million, how-
ever, all have more than five offices - the largest has 23.
It appears that above a certain scale of billings, agencies find
it more economical to operate out of several offices, or multiple offices
are required to attract the account size necessary to grow above billings
of $100 million. Thus there may be a rational need for small agencies to
diversify geographically if they wish to grow very large.
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4.5 Service Expanison
A Booz Allen study performed in 1965 discussed how the explosion in
diversity of products had fragmented the market and resulted in the pro-
liferation of advertisements for competing brands. The study concluded
that manufacturers had been forced to view advertising as one segment of
a marketing program - not an isolated expense. The study went further
to note that this trend had created a need for an ad agency that could
provide full marketing support.52
Indeed, having read through piles of merger announcements, I believe
that almost every merger since World War II has been partly justified by a
need to broaden services. The services typically include marketing re-
search, merchandising consultation, TV programming, and public relations,
as well as other assorted categories. While reading through several decades
of magazine articles. I noted a good deal of ambivalence about clients'
desire for the extra services. Jack Young (president of the Foods Division
of Quaker Oats) is quoted as stating that Quaker is not looking for agencies
to help with their marketing effort.5 3 Also, the Booz Allen study noted
that in 1965 there was a trend among advertisers toward self-sufficiency
in their marketing departments. The attitude of most advertisers was that
advertising creation was the only essential element that an ad agency could
do better than an in-house marketing staff.5 4
Of course, the ability of a firm to fund a, sophisticated in-house
marketing staff depends on the firm's size. Companies smaller than Quaker
Oats may find it economical to use ad agency services rather than carry a
staff of marketing scientists. Thus there may bea need for full service
agencies among smaller for less mature firms. A survey performed by the
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American Marketing Association revealed that many of the surveyed ad agencies
were using in-house staff to provide the extra research services (Table 4-3).
It would seem likely that ad agencies also have some minimal billings size
below which they cannot economically carry on in-house research staff.
Presumably small agencies could purchase the services of an outside re-
search firm, but in-house services may offer advantages in tighter mana-
gerial control on availability and quality of the research team. Thus
there may be a rational incentive for merging to reach a scale that allows
the establishment of in-house research facilities.
Table 4-3. Research Services Provided by Ad Agencies via an In-House Staff
Research Activity
motivation research
copy research
media research
studies of ad effectiveness
new product acceptance
competitive product studies
product testing
development of market potentials
market share analysis
consumer panel operations
Percent of Surveyed Agencies Performing
Activity with In-House Staff
38
51
45
49
53
52
39
53
50
30
Data taken from: 1968 Survey of Marketing Research
American Marketing Association
Chicago, Illinois, 1968, p. 44.
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4.6 Clientele Diversification
Another motive constantly mentioned in connection with ad agency
mergers is a need to diversify an agency's business segment or simply
expand the number of accounts. As an example, the agency Marstellar Inc.
was started in 1951 with two accounts - Clark Equipment and Rockwell.
Those two clients accounted for two-thirds of Marstellar's total business
for the first several years of its existence. Given its heavy dependence
on the two clients, one of Marstellar's highest priorites was to diversify
55its client list for risk reduction. It did this by first seeking new
business and later by acquiring agencies.
As discussed in Seciton 3.3.3 of this report, modern finance theory
holds that a company should not seek diversification for risk reduction
since stockholders can do it much more efficiently by adjusting their
portfolios. But as mentioned earlier, most ad agencies are closely held by
private investors for whom diversification through company efforts any be
rational. Marstellar's early efforts at diversification appear to fit
this category.
Marstellar is not alone in its efforts. In the early 1970's a
survey was conducted among executives working for 50 of the top ad agencies.
A common view was the diversification was necessary to create security and
stability in a business that needs both very badly.5 6
The instability of an agency's business is still a subject of concern
and is often mentioned in connection with today's agency mergers. In the
1960's, Ogilvy and Mather's top ten clients provided 67 percent of its
billings, but today that number is down to 34 percent. Some industry ob-
servers view this as a result of the agencies' consolidation trend, which
52
will have a beneficial effect of stabilizing their business. Account
switching has always been a major source of risk for advertising agencies.
Even though an account remains with an agency for an average of nine years,
one agency executive summarized the situation when he stated that "in this
business you only know that you'll have an account for the next 90 days,
the standard termination period".58 In fact, agency executives informally
say that the 90-day period can shrink to thirty days or less since it is
common practice to accept early termination if the client is not satisfied
with the relationship.
Thereare also indications that diversification of the client base
for cash flow stability also concerns the clients. A survey of advertisers
conducted by Industrial Marketing revealed that many advertisers don't want
to be the largest account in an agency for two major reasons. First, it
makes changing agencies appear heavy-handed. Second, concentration of such
a large percentage of an agency's billings in one account may choke the
agency's cash flow - causing it to become financially unstable.5 9
One incident of interest involves the merger of Campbell-Ewald with
Interpublic in 1972. Campbell-Ewald was heavily dependent on Chevrolet's
account for its existence and was searching for a merger to diversify its
client base. When Campbell-Ewald merged with Interpublic, which had GM's
Buick account, rumors began spreading that GM had pressured Campbell-Ewald
to carry through with the merger as a means to stabilize the agency's
60
finances. Clients prefer to see an agency with whom they have a success-
ful relationship remain financially viable. All parties involved in the
merger disavowed such pressure, but all openly agreed that it was to
Chevrolet's advantage to complete the merger.
53
Another incentive for an agency to diversity its client base lies
in the conflict of interest question which arises when one agency attempts
to handle two accounts in the same industry. It has long been customary
for advertisers to demand that agencies not handle accounts for products
which compete with their own for consumer attention. Even when not handl-
ing directly competing products, there is the concern that working on non-
competitive products for companies that do compete in other areas may
result in the leakage of proprietary information through the ad agency.
Today this premise is beginning to be questioned. Some large ad agencies
are organizing autonomous divisions that presumably can handle competing
accounts without conflict of interest problems.6 1
However, the problem has not disappeared completely. A survey con-
ducted by Advertising Age in 1979 revealed that when a client's agency is
considering a merger, the conflict of interest question runs second only
62
to inquiries about the financial stability of the merged entity. For
the small or mid-size agencies not organized on a divisional basis, the
conflict of interest problem would appear to still be a valid issue.
If a smaller agency has specialized in one industry (electronics,'
pharmaceuticals, etc.), it may reach a point beyond which it cannot grow
because of account conflicts. Diversifying outside this pecialty, how-
ever, might be blocked since it will have established a reputation as a
specialty shop. Campbell-Ewald encountered this difficulty in the early
1970's when it was known as an automotive agency. It found it very dif-
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ficult to diversify into pharmaceutical or package goods. The solution
as voiced by many agencies is to merge specialty agencies and grow from
there. However, it is unclear as to why two specialty shops should
54
succeed at attracting accounts outside their specialties simply because
they have merged. The underlying argument appears to be that the con-
solidation of various specialty shops into a multi-specialty agency will,
through synergy, permit greater overall growth than the sum of the indi-
vidual agencies. This is an interesting assertion, but its testing
is beyond the scope of this report.
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CHAPTER 5
ECONOMIES OF SCALE
5.1 Agency Statistical Data
Economies of scale are often voiced as a primary incentive behind
ad agency mergers. Merger announcements, however, are typically very
vague with regard to the sources of these economies. Usually some ref-
erence is made to merging and triming of research departments or the con-
solidation of separate offices in the same city. This section of the
thesis investigates the economies of scale premise by observing how ad
agency labor expense varies with agency size and media mix. A study per-
formed by the American Association of Advertising Agencies (AAAA) demon-
strates that labor expense typically accounts for more than 65% of an ad
agency's total operating expenses. If other expenses closely related
to labor (pension plans, etc.) are also included, more than 70% of a
typical ad agency's expenses are related to labor.6 5 Thus the number of
personnel a given ad agency employs provides some indication of that
agency's cost structure relative to other agencies.
To test the hypothesis that large agencies benefit from economies
of scale the number of agency employees divided by the agency's gross
income (in term of $100,000) was calculated for a selected sample of 94
advertising agencies. This calculation provides the average number of
exmployees a given agency requires to handle an account generating
$100,000 of gross income. Gross income (GI) includes the agency's media
commission, mark-ups on suppliers' bills, and its fee for additional
66
services. Thus GI approximates the funds an agency has available to
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cover in-house expenses. Since labor roughly approximates 70% of a
typical agency's expenses (or 50 to 60% of GI), the number of employees
per $100,000 of GI provides an approximate measure of an agency's
expenses/GI ratio as follows:
expenses labor expense P · NEMP
GI GI GI
NEMP = number of personnel employed by an agency
P = average pay per employee
The average pay per employee (P) will be dropped from the equation for
the rest of the analysis. The ratio of NEMP/GI will be used as a sur-
rogate measure. This assumes that P does not vary across agencies which
may not be true. For one thing, the skill level of employees may vary
with agency thus causing average pay to vary from agency to agency. For
purposes of this analysis, however, this factor will be assumed to be of
secondary importance. If large agencies realize economies of scale, the
NEMP/GI ratio should decrease with increasing agency size.
Statistics for the number of employees and GI were collected for
94 ad agencies. These data were taken from the 1978 edition of Advertis-
ing Age's annual issue covering the top 600 US. ad agencies.6 7 Each
year this issue lists the agencies sequentially by billing size. The
sample of 94 used in this thesis was selected by-choosing every sixth
agency in the list of 600; starting with the largest agency. The U.S.
GI and U.S. employee statistics were recorded for the selected agencies.
Additionally, the percent media mix (newspaper, magazine, TV, radio) was
recorded for each ad agency in order to determine if media mix affects
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the cost structure of an ad agency. The media mix data was taken from
the 1978 edition of the Standard Directory of Advertising Agencies. The
resulting data base covers the following gross income and billings range:
Domestic U.S. Billings per agency
$440,000 to $619,000,000
Domestic U.S. GI per agency
$48,000 to $92,800,000
5.2 Statistical Tests
As a first test, the NEMP/GI ratio was plotted as a scattergram
with GI on the X axis and NEMP/GI on the Y axis (Figure 5-1). As demon-
strated in Figure 5-1, there does indeed appear to be a trend of decreas-
ing NEMP/GI with increasing GI. Since the NEMP/GI ratio appears to be
falling toward an asymptote of approximately 2.5, an equation of the
form shown in Table 5-1 was fitted to the data points using the nonlinear
regression package in the TROLL statistical program at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. The format of the equation in Table 5-1 was
chosen since it has the property of declining from an initially high
value toward an asymptote as shown in Figure 5-2. This appears to
approximate the shape of the scattergram in Figure 5-1. Table 5-1 shows
the result of the regression. The value of 2.5 for C3 implies that this
is approximately the minimum NEMP/GI ratio that an agency can achieve.
The F statistic indicates that the null hypothesis (C2 = C3 = 0) can be
rejected at the .01 critical probability level. In other words, the
regression lends statistical support to the premise that larger agencies
are able to function with fewer employees per dollar of gross income.
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Table 5-1. Equation and Results for Model AS
Equation:
K = C1 + C2 · (C3 X)
X = domestic US gross income for a
K = employees/gross income
C1, C2, C3 =
Results of Regression:
Coefficient
C1
C2
C3
Corrected R
Durbin Watson (0)
Sum of Squared Residuals
F(2/91)
Standard Error
regression coefficiencts
Value
2.50909
4.10559
-5.25735
T-Statistic
18.89710
5.58055
3.95739
= .44781
= 1.86
= 77.582
= 38.711
= .9233
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It was next attempted to introduce media mix effects into the
equation. This was attempted in a stepwise manner-using the equations
listed in Table 5-2. It had been. planned to perform F tests of signif-
icance among the various equations to see which specifications performed
best. Unfortunately, the nonlinear regression package in TROLL was able
to estimate only equations A5 and A8 (Table 5-2). Various methods, such
as specifying initial values for the coefficients, were attempted as a
means to solve the regression. However, all failed with the software
printing out error messages to the effect that the solution had diverged.
Tables 5-1 and 5-3 present the results of the two equations for which a
solution was found. As shown in Table 5-3, Model A5's corrected R has
improved over Model A8's corrected R2 (Table 5-1). The various media do
appear to differentially effect the asymptote to which the agency's
NEMP/GI ratio is falling. Table 5-4 shows the calculation of the F test
of significance for the introduction of media effects between Model A8
and Model A5. The F statistic demonstrates that the null hypothesis of
no effects can be rejected and that the introduction of media effects
into the asymptote has contributed to the equation.
5.3 Modified Regression Equations
Since the nonlinear regression software was not able to handle the
majority of the equations shown in Table 5-2, a set of linearized equa-
tions (Table 5-5) was next used. The basic equation, B4 in Table 5-5,
can be rewritten as follows:
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In (K) = A +B n (X)
K = EXP[A] EXP[B n (X)]
K = EXP[A] XB
This form can then be manipulated as follows:
dK = EXP[A] B 
XdK = B EXP[A] ·X X/K dX
X dK
= b
K dX
Thus B can be interpreted as a constant elasticity of cost (K) with
agency size (X). The equation can also demonstrate declining costs (K)
with increasing agency size (X). Unfortunately, the equation approaches
an asymptote of 0. This is certainly a weakness of the model, but it
was hoped that some information regarding differential media effects
relating to slope might still be obtained from the regression results.
Tables 5-6 through 5-9 list the regression results for Models B1 through
B5.
Coefficient B in Model B4 (Table 5-9) represents the elasticity
of cost term. The value of the coefficient (-.12946) indicates that a
proportional increase (L) in an agency's GI is accompanied by a propor-
tional decrease (.12946 · L) in the agency's NEMP/GI ratio. GI is in
terms of $100,000.
When media mex effects are introduced into the ln( ) term of the
equation as shown in Table 5-7, the corrected R2 is reduced (Table 5-7).
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Table 5-2. Initial Equation Used in Regression
Analysis on Agency Statistical Data
EquationModel
N
K. = j Sij [A
j=l
N
K. = Z A. [Sij]
j=l 1
N
K. = Z A[Sij] +j=l J
Ki1
Ki1
Ki1
N
= A+ Z B [Sij
j=l j
+ B. EXP[CjXi]] + 
N
j=l
N
j=1
B[SijEXPCjX i] l]
Bj [SijEXP[CXi]] +
EXP[CjXill] + 
N
Aj[Sij] + B[EXP[CXi]] + j=l 
N
= A + B[ Sij.EXP[CjXi]]
j=l 13 
N
Ki = A + Z B[SijEXP[CXi]] +
j=l 3 i
K. = A + B[EXP[CXi] + 1. 
PARAMETERS: K. = employees/GI for agency i1
S..
13
= fraction of agency i's GCI in media j
X. = agency i's GI1
Al
A2
A3
A4
£
A5
A6
A7
A8
64
Table 5-3. Equation and Results for Model A5
Equation:
N
K Z= A.[Si.] + B[EXP[CX.]] + jl 13 .ij
Media
business press
direct mail
farm publications
magazines
newspapers
point of purchase
radio
TV
outdoor
other
Coefficient
Al
A2
A3
A4
A5
A6
A7
A8
A9
A10
B
C 
Value
1.773
2.444
2.447
.882
4.337
5.987
3.219
1.933
5.959
3.530
3.53829
-5.79648
T-Statistic
3.05445
2.76429
2.33933
1.93068
6.91809
1.98377
4.20557
6.07922
4.02913
8.83904
4.73178
3.43794
Corrected R
Burbin Watson (0)
Sum of Squared Residuals
F(ii/82)
Standard Error
= .5814
= 1.95
= 52.997
= 12.743
= .8039
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Table 5-4. Test of Significance of Including Media Mix
Effects in the Asymptote of the Regression
Equation
F(DFR -DFU, DFU) =R n U' U
DF
SSR
subscript R
subscript U
Model 1
DFR =
SSRR =
Model 2
DFU =
SSRU =
(SSRU - SSRRY(DFR - DFU)
SSR/DFU
= degrees of freedom
= sum of squared residuals
= restricted, fewer coefficients
= unrestircted, more coefficients
N- 3
77.582
= 94 - 3 = 91
N - 5 - 3 = 94 - 10 - 2 = 82
52.997
The test statistic is F(9/82) = 3.9039
66
Table 5-5. Second Set of Equation Used in Regression
Analysis on Agency Statistical Data
Model
B1 ln (Ki)
B2 l (K.
B2 ln (Ki)
B3 ln (Ki )
N N
-- AjSij + .Bj ln [S X] + 
j=l j=l j
N
= A + B n [S ijXi] + ej=l s ii
N
= A.SiA + B[ln[Xi]] + 
j=l ~s i j
B4 in (Ki) = A + B[ln[Xi ] + 
PARAMETERS:
Ki = employees/GI for agency i
Sij = fraction of agency i's GI in media jii
Xi = agency i's GIi
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Table 5-6. Results for Model B1
ln (Ki) 
N N
X A.S.. + 
j=l 3 1J j=l
Bj ln [SijXi]
Media Coefficient
businesspress
direct mail
farm publications
magazine
newspapers
point of purchase
radio
TV
outdoor
other
businesspress
direct mail
farm publications
magazines
newspapers
point of purchase
radio
TV
outdoor
other
2
Corrected R
Durbin Watson (0)
Sum Squared Residuals
F(19/74)
Standard Error
Al
A2
A3
A4
A5
A6
A7
A8
A9
A10
B1
B2
B3
B4
B5
B6
B7
B8
B9
B10
Value
.49962
1.55173
1.42642
.05840
1.4777
3.14293
.85821
.19716
.53608
.71402
-.00867
-.03324
-.01177
.00431
-.0465
-.02408
.00412
.00035
.04334
.00372
T-Statistic
1.41794
2.69617
2.39632
.15331
3.68612
1.93227
1.75667
.72717
.68376
2.00688
-.58416
-1.37760
-.61132
.22098
-1.22911
-1.04817
.13366
.01416
2.53178
.24866
= .39183
= 1.84
= 7.065
= 4.154
= .3090
Equation:
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Table 5-7. Results for Model B2
Equation:
N
ln(Ki) = A + Z B.ln[SijXi]
j=l 3
Media
businesspress
direct mail
farm publication
magazine
newspaper
point of purchase
radio
TV
outdoor
other
2
Corrected R =
Durbin Watson (0) =
Sum Squared Residuals =
F(10/83) =
Standard Error =
Coefficient
A
B1
B2
B3
B4
B5
B6
B7
B8
B9
B10
Value
.80232
-.02538
-.09979
-.00148
-.04115
.02905
-.00479
.00655
-.04885
.03867
.00388
T-Statistic
4.69932
-2.18898
-1.33885
-.10234
-2.8998
1.04859
-.33196
.2554
-2.7389
2.84755
.383
.25806
1.93
9.668
4.235
.3413
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Table 5-8. Results of Model B3
Equation:
ln(Ki) =1
Media
N
Z A.Si. + B[ln[X.]] + 
j=l J J 
Coefficient Value T-Statistic
businesspress
direct mail
farm publications
magazines
newspapers
point of purchase
radio
TV
outdoor
other
2
Corrected R =
Durbin Watson (0) =
Sum Squared Residuals =
F(10/83) =
Standard Error =
Al
A2
A3
A4
A5
A6
A7
A8
A10
B
.6407
1.23253
1.26794
.46844
1.62426
2.13924
1.3851
.7276
1.25364
-.0823
3.06628
3.843
3.33065
2.83409
7.31503
1.92674
4.88776
5.3355
8.60599
-3.36614
.42412
1.79
7.504
7.849
.3007
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Table 5-9. Results of Model B4
Equation:
K = A + B[ln[Xi]] + 
IJ
Coefficient
A
B
Value
1.03626
-.12946
Corrected R2
T-Statistic
29.6565
-5.96798
= .27127
Durbin Watson (0) = 1.76
Sum Squared Residuals = 10.526
F(1/92) = 35.619
Standard Error = .3382
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This also occurred between Model B3 (Table 5-9) and Model B1 (Table 5-6).
When media mix is introduced into the constant term (Model B3, Table
5-9), the corrected R2 is increased. This is true of the transition
between model B4 (Table 5-8) and Model B3 (Table 5-8) as well as between
Model B2 (Table 5-7) and Model B1 (Table 5-6). An F test was performed
to determine if the addition of more coefficients statistically improved
the fit of the model. The results, as summarized in Table 5-10, seem
to indicate that media mix effects do not significantly improve the fit
when used to modify the elasticity term. They do contribute to the
equation when used to modify the scale term - coefficient A in Model B4.
As mentioned earlier in this section, Model B4 suffers from the
deficiency of approaching an asymptote of zero. This is intuitively a weak
point given the shape of Figure 5-1. A test of this weakness can be made
by plotting the regression residuals for Models A5 and B3. These two
equations are being compared because they attained the best fit among
their respective formats - non-zero vs. zero asymptote. The residual
plot for A5 (Figure 5-3) appears to display very little systematic
influence. The residual plot for A3 (Figure 5-4) however does appear to
have a systematic component. On the basis of the residual plots equation
A3 appears superior for avoiding systematic over or under estimation.
5.4 Analysis-of Regression Results
The regression results of Model Al appear to indicate that large
agencies do benefit from economies of scale. One measure of this effect
is the maximum reduction in the NEMP/GI ratio that a firm could realize.
This can be calcaluted as follows:
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maximum NEMP/GI = C1 + C2 EXP(C3 · 0)
= C1 + C2
minimum NEMP/GI = Cl + C2 EXP(C3 ·a)
- C1
maximum reduction in NEMP/GI
C1 + C2 - C1
Cl + C2
C2
C1 + C2 = 62%
Refer to Table 5-1 for coefficient definitions.
A second way of viewing this effect is to calculate the value of
GI at which an agency will be within 1% of its minimum cost. This can
be calculated as follows:
D = .01, (1% differential above maximum scale economy)
(1 + D)C1 = C1 + C2 · EXP(C3 · X)
X = D n (D C2
D C2
X = GI of agency
Various values of D can be used to determine the range of GI in
which agencies begin to reach their maximum efficiency as listed here:
Necessary GI
of Agency
Approximate Billing
Size of Agency
$6,467,400
5,588,380
5,074,193
4,709,367
4,426,387
D
.01
.02
.03
.04
.05
$970,110
838,257
761,129
706,405
663,958
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Table 5-10. Significance Tests as the Addition
of More Coefficients to the Second
Set of Regression Models
Test of Significance Between
Model and Model
B4 B2 F(9, 83) = .81843
B4 B3 F(9, 83) = 4.5177
B3 Bi F(9, 74) = .5109
B2 Bl F(9, 74) = 3.029
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The billing size of the agency listed above was calculated by dividing
GI by .15 - the typical media commission rate. The above data appears
to imply that economies of scale effects take place mostly below the
$4 to $6 million ranges billings.
In Section 3.4.1 of this thesis, it was mentioned that in the
1950's the billings range of $3 to 15 million was viewed as a difficult
range in which agency costs rose more rapidly than revenue. Published
media cost indeces6 8 can be used to inflate this billings range esti-
mate to present day estimates (circa 1978). In today's terms, the
equivalent range is approximately between $7 and $36 million in billings.
This does not match the data presented above, which indicates that the
NEMP/GI ratio stabilizes in billings ranges above $4 to $6 million.
If there were a range of billings in which costs suddenly in-
creased faster than revenue, one might expect to observe the NEMP/GI
ratio to initially decrease for small agencies. However, a second peak
should occur in the "danger zone" of $7 to $36 million. This would be
approximately the GI range of $1 to $5.5 million. Looking at Figure 5-1
one does see a bulge in the region of $1 million GI. However, when media
effects are added (Model A5, Table 5-3) to the regression equation and
the regression residuals graphed versus agency size (Figure 5-3), a mid-
range bulge is not immediately apparent. Thus statistical evidence sup-
porting a "danger zone" for agency growth has not been found. One must
admit, however, that visual interpretation of residual plots is subject
to the bias of the viewer.
The F test on the regression results of Models A8 and A5 indicate
that media mix does affect the NEMP/GI ratio of ad agencies. In
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particular, equation A5 demonstrates their effect on the minimum value
of the employee/GI ratio. Unfortunately, the media effect on the
exponential coefficients in Models Al through A8 could not be estimated
due to the limitations of the statistical software used in the analysis.
Models B1 through B4 attempted to solve this problem by linearizing
the equations. The resulting regressions did not demonstrate a media
effect on the cost elasticity term however. An effect was demonstrated
on the scale term (EXP[A], Model B3).
As the A. coefficient in Model B3 becomes more positive, the1
effect on the associated media i is to increasingly raise the NEMP/
GI ratio for a given GI level. Likewise, in Model A5, increasingly
positive values for A result in larger values for the NEMP/GI
asymptote. Thus while the formats of Models A5 and B3 are different,
it is interesting to compare the rank ordering of media effect on NEMP/GI
between the two models. Table 5-11 accomplishes this by sequentially
ordering the Ai (Model B3) and A (Model A5) coefficients. Although the
rank ordering changes slightly between models, three groups of media
emerge as consistant subgroups:
Group Media
1 magazine
business press
TV
2 direct mail
other
farm publications
radio
3 newspapers
joint of purchase
outdoor
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The results of the regression analysis appear to imply that group
3 media require a higher NEMP/GI ratio than other media. One might con-
jecture that smaller agencies might choose to specialize in those media
which require fewer personnel per dollar of revenue. This premise can
be tested by calculating the mean percent of an agency's billings derived
from a given media, and observing how this varies with agency size.
Table 5-12 does this. From a visual inspection it appears that as agency
size increases, the percent of billing derived from direct mail, news-
paper, point of purchase, and radio generally decreases. However, the
percent of billing derived from outdoor and TV appear to rise. Since TV
had one of the lower values in Table 5-11, this implies it has a low
NEMP/GI ratio. By earlier conjecture this might lead one to expect that
small agencies might prefer to specialize in this medium. However,
Table 5-12 indicates that TV is handled mostly by large agencies. This
paradox might be explained by the actions of advertisers. Network TV
account sizes may be sufficiently large, such that TV advertisers con-
ciously seek out only the larger agencies for reasons discussed in Sec-
tion 4.3. Thus economies of scale may have little effect on whether a
small agency breaks into the TV medium. With regard to the other media,
there does not appear to be a strong trend wherein media with a high
NEMP/GI ratio (point of purchase, newspapers, etc.) are handled only
by large agencies.
What is interesting to discuss is why media would have different
NEMP/GI ratios. One point to note is that the media with low NEMP/GI
(magazines, business press, TV) appear to be national in nature while the
high NEMP/GI media (newspapers, point of purchase, outdoor) appear to
80
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operate in a local context. This is pure conjecture of course but the
media which operate in a national context may permit the greater cen-
tralization of ad campaign planning, copy design and research staff.
Media operating in a local context may require greater in-depth knowledge
of the fractionalized local markets. They may therefore not permit the
degree of centralization of ad agency staff that national media afford,
and thus might not permit economies of scale through consolidation of
staff.
A second point of conjecture is that all media expenditures may
not respond equally with swings in the general economy. Modern finance
theory states that investors determine the rate of return they demand
for a given project by the amount of risk in a project that is system-
atically related to the overall economy. If the various media contained
different systematic risk components they should have different rates of
return. Thus their revenue and expense ratios would differ. This is a
very unsophisticated argument and it mixes accounting (revenue, expense)
with cash concepts. However, it is only meant as a possible explanation
for some media to apparently be more lucrative than others.
In summary, regression analysis on ad agency statistical data
appear to demonstrate that economies of scale effects do take place. One
cross check on the equations estimated in this thesis can be found in a
study performed by the management consultants, Rubel & Hymphrey in Chicago.
Their study calculated a NEMP/GI ratio for various agency sizes based on
actual agency financial data. This data is listed in Table 5-13 along
with a predicted value for NEFP/GI based on the equation estimated for
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Table 5-13, Comparison of Predicted and Published
Data for Employees/Gross Income
Agency
Gross Income
($000,000)
.15
.45
.75
1.50
2.25
Predicted
By *
Model 1
4.38
2.89
2'.59
2.51
2.51
3.0 2.51
6.0
Published Data
>4.0
>3.4
>3.0
>3.0
>3.2
>2.6
2.51
Model 1 is located in Table 5-1 of this thesis.
These data points are presented as being applicable for
a range of gross income. Thus, for agencies with gross
income between $150,000 and $450,000, the employee/GI
number is 4.0.
Data taken from:* "Study Shows Agency Profits Up,
Payroll Down", Advertising Age, May 14, 1979, p. 10.
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Model Al (Table 5-1) in this thesis. The predicted values for NEMP/GI
appear to-approach the asymptote much earlier than the Rubel & Humphrey
data indicates. It is encouraging, however, to see that both data sets
appear to approach the range of 2.5 for the minimum value of NEMP/GI.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
The envrionmental factors discussed in Chapter 3, and the merger
motives covered in Chapter 4 of this thesis are supported at best with
circumstantial evidence. Nevertheless many of them do sound plausible
(e.g., size stigma, risk reduction) in the context of the typical adver-
tising agency. However, the statistical data presented in Chapter 5
does lend strong support to the premise that economies of scale do accrue
to the larger agencies. Thus, behind all of the vague reasons voiced by
agency executives, may be a rational economic justification to seek
growth through merger - economies of scale.
Of course this doesn't answer the question as to why mergers
occurred in waves. This thesis attempted to address that question by
identifying environmental factors peculiar to the periods of heightened
merger activity. I acknowledge that the evidence is suggestive at best.
However the motives advanced for the merger waves of 1958 (appearance of
TV) and the late 1960's (growing international opportunity, diversifica-
tion) do sound plausible. However, the motives advanced in explanation
of the late 1970's wave appear weakest. It is not apparent as to why
increased cash flow to ad agencies should cause more mergers. The buying
power of the increased cash flow should be negated by the increased mar-
ket value of the available agencies - unless large and small agencies
are differentially affected. This could be a good point for further
investigation. Unfortunately it is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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APPENDIX A
AD AGENCY MERGER DATA
ORGANIZED BY YEAR OF
MERGER COMPLETION
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